U.S. Structured Finance's Exposure To Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, And Silvergate Bank Appears To Be Minimal (2024)

View Analyst Contact Information

  • Table of Contents
    • Signature Bank's Role As Bank Account Provider
    • Signature Bank's Role As An LOC provider
    • Related Research

NEW YORK (S&P Global Ratings) March 17, 2023--U.S. structured finance transactions rated by S&P Global Ratings appear to have minimal exposure to the recent failures of Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and Silvergate Bank (see the Related Research section for more details).

Based upon our review of our rated portfolio to date:

  • Neither Silicon Valley Bank nor Silvergate Bank serves as counterparty to any U.S. structured finance transaction rated by S&P Global Ratings.
  • Exposure to Signature Bank is limited to two structured finance transactions: a residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction in which Signature Bank serves as a bank account provider, and a variable-rate demand obligation (VRDO) in which Signature Bank provides a letter of credit (LOC).

Signature Bank's Role As Bank Account Provider

Based upon our review to date of our rated portfolio, Signature Bank's role as a bank account provider appears to be limited to one RMBS transaction. Bank account providers, which are not typically publicly named entities within RMBS securitization documents, briefly hold funds prior to disbursem*nt to investors. Due to the degree of reliance on the bank account provider, which acts as an eligible institution for the funds that support our rated transactions, we assess the credit risk related to such entities through the application of our counterparty risk criteria (see "Counterparty Risk Framework: Methodology And Assumptions," published March 8, 2019). We understand that the sponsor of the affected transaction has already taken steps to replace Signature Bank with an alternate bank account provider.

Signature Bank's Role As An LOC provider

Based upon our review to date of our rated portfolio, Signature Bank's role as an LOC provider appears to be limited to one VRDO, for which Signature Bank provides a fronting letter of credit (FLOC). Another unaffected bank provides a confirming letter of credit (CLOC).

The LOCs provide coverage for the bonds during the rated interest-rate mode, during which bondholders may tender their bonds upon providing appropriate notice. As with other similar confirming structures, payments of principal and interest are paid initially from a draw on the FLOC.

Should the FLOC provider dishonor a draw or repudiate the LOC, the trustee is instructed to declare an acceleration and make a single demand on the CLOC to pay full principal and accrued interest. While bondholders typically receive funds from a draw on the FLOC, the document provisions requiring a full payment of principal and interest from the confirming provider result in credit risk being linked to the performance of the CLOC provider. We understand that a bridge bank has stepped in to take over Signature Bank's role as FLOC provider in the exposed transaction.

There have been no structured finance-related rating actions to date in connection with the bank failures. As part of our ongoing surveillance activities, we are monitoring developments in the banking sector that may be relevant to our rated structured finance portfolio.

Related Research

This report does not constitute a rating action.

S&P Global Ratings, part of S&P Global Inc. (NYSE: SPGI), is the world's leading provider of independent credit risk research. We publish more than a million credit ratings on debt issued by sovereign, municipal, corporate and financial sector entities. With over 1,400 credit analysts in 26 countries, and more than 150 years' experience of assessing credit risk, we offer a unique combination of global coverage and local insight. Our research and opinions about relative credit risk provide market participants with information that helps to support the growth of transparent, liquid debt markets worldwide.

Primary Contacts:James T Taylor, New York+ 1 (212) 438 6067;
james.taylor@spglobal.com
Alexander J Gombach, New York+ 1 (212) 438 2882;
alexander.gombach@spglobal.com
Research Contact:Tom Schopflocher, New York+ 1 (212) 438 6722;
tom.schopflocher@spglobal.com
Media Contact:Jeff Sexton, New York+ 1 (212) 438 3448;
jeff.sexton@spglobal.com

No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced, or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.

Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment, and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors, and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.

To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.

S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.

S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.spglobal.com/ratings (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.spglobal.com/usratingsfees.

Create a free account to unlock the article.

Gain access to exclusive research, events and more.

Register

Already have an account? Sign in

U.S. Structured Finance's Exposure To Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, And Silvergate Bank Appears To Be Minimal (2024)

FAQs

Why did Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank fail? ›

Signature Bank was the third-largest bank failure in U.S. history and came directly after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). As with SVB, its collapse is partly attributed to fears about a high percentage of uninsured deposits.

What happened to Silvergate and Silicon Valley Bank? ›

Why did Silvergate and Signature Bank Collapse? In hindsight, it was obvious. Silvergate, the bank that reported a $1 billion loss for 2022, following a brutal series of crypto meltdowns, shut its doors on March 9th, a day before SVB.

How much did the Signature Bank failure cost? ›

The FDIC estimates the cost of the failure of Signature Bank to the DIF to be approximately $2.4 billion.

Who is to blame for the Silicon Valley bank collapse? ›

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) failed because of a textbook case of mismanagement by the bank. Its senior leadership failed to manage basic interest rate and liquidity risk. Its board of directors failed to oversee senior leadership and hold them accountable.

What happened to Signature Bank in simple terms? ›

Less than 48 hours after SVB failed, after witnessing a large run on customer deposits, Signature Bank was closed by the New York State Department of Financial Services and placed under the receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

What really went wrong with Silicon Valley Bank? ›

The collapse happened for multiple reasons, including a lack of diversification and a classic bank run, where many customers withdrew their deposits simultaneously due to fears of the bank's solvency. Many of SVB's depositors were startup companies.

What are the problems with Silvergate Bank? ›

Silvergate's liquidation stemmed from its concentration in crypto industry deposit customers, rapid growth, and multilayered funding risks due to nearly all of the bank's deposits being uninsured and noninterest bearing. It also had significant weaknesses in its corporate governance and risk management capabilities.

Why did the Silvergate Bank fail? ›

“The problems that faced Silvergate were primarily a result of less-than-adequate risk management, notably one of relying too much on volatile short-term deposits while lending or investing at a longer duration,” Weisberger said.

Why did Silvergate Bank fail? ›

The bank's corporate governance and risk management capabilities did not keep pace with the bank's rapid growth, increasing complexity, and evolving risk profile,” the report concluded.

Will Signature Bank go out of business? ›

On March 12, 2023, Signature Bank, New York, NY, was closed by the New York State Department of Financial Services and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was named Receiver.

Is Silvergate Bank still in business? ›

On March 8, 2023, it was announced that Silvergate Bank would wind down its operations and liquidate.

Will Signature Bank be bailed out? ›

MORE: US government seized the assets of two failing banks

But now, as Hogan puts it, the government is not coming to save SVB or Signature Bank - noting that all the money is going towards depositors, not the banks.

What banks are affected by the Silicon Valley collapse? ›

Banks affected were First Republic Bank, PacWest Bancorp, Regions Financial and Zions Bancorporation. Even shares of big banks lost ground in the aftermath of the SVB and Signature collapses, including Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup.

What bank was taken over by the Feds? ›

It's the largest lender to collapse since the 2008 financial crisis — bigger than Silicon Valley Bank, which went under in March. First Republic Bank has been taken over by federal regulators and will be sold to JPMorgan — making it the third major bank to go under in less than two months.

How could SVB be avoided? ›

Some banking experts believe that had there been better oversight of SVB's management of their investment portfolio, including regular analysis of their interest rate risks, this would not have happened. 2) Liquidity and Cash Management Planning. Timing was a big issue at play for SVB.

What caused the failure of Signature Bank? ›

The collapse of Signature Bank was due to “poor management,” according to a report from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation released Friday. Bank management “did not always heed FDIC examiner concerns, and was not always responsive or timely in addressing FDIC supervisory recommendations,” the report said.

When did the banks Silicon Valley and Signature fail? ›

On March 10, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) failed after a bank run, marking the third-largest bank failure in United States history and the largest since the 2007–2008 financial crisis. It was one of three bank failures, along with Silvergate Bank and Signature Bank, in March 2023 in the United States.

Was Silicon Valley Bank too big to fail? ›

Most significant, the nation learned over the weekend that Silicon Valley Bank, the 16th largest depository institution in the United States, was deemed by the government to be too big to fail — at least in the sense that the normal rules for allocating losses were set aside.

How did the FDIC's handling of the SVB collapse differ from past bank failures? ›

What happens to any payments (wires/ACH/checks) that are outstanding? Payments drawn on accounts will paid by the Bridge Banks. In a typical bank failure, the FDIC would only process payments up to the $250,000 insurance limit but we believe all deposits with SVB and Signature Bank will be honored.

Top Articles
Latest Posts
Article information

Author: Carlyn Walter

Last Updated:

Views: 5928

Rating: 5 / 5 (50 voted)

Reviews: 81% of readers found this page helpful

Author information

Name: Carlyn Walter

Birthday: 1996-01-03

Address: Suite 452 40815 Denyse Extensions, Sengermouth, OR 42374

Phone: +8501809515404

Job: Manufacturing Technician

Hobby: Table tennis, Archery, Vacation, Metal detecting, Yo-yoing, Crocheting, Creative writing

Introduction: My name is Carlyn Walter, I am a lively, glamorous, healthy, clean, powerful, calm, combative person who loves writing and wants to share my knowledge and understanding with you.